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HOW THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
IMITATES THE WORLD SERIES
Michael Herz*

INTRODUCTION

The longstanding debate over the electoral college is now
sufficiently mature that there may be nothing new to say.' When a
subject has become overfamiliar, sometimes it is best approached
from the side rather than head-on. In this Article I approach the
electoral college debate from the side by considering its dominant
metaphor, in the hope that doing so will "liberate rather than
enslave thought."^
The pervasive metaphor invoked to justify not simply giving
the White House to the candidate who receives the most votes is
the World Series. To win the World Series, a team must win four
games. The winner always and by definition prevails in a majority
of the games played. However, the winner does not necessarily
score the most total runs. If it loses blowouts and wins squeakers,
a team will win the Series despite scoring far fewer total runs.
The most striking example of a "gerrymandered" World
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. This
Article's title, as fans of baseball writing will recognize, is borrowed, mutatis mutandis,
from a well-known paean to the sport of baseball. See THOMAS BOSWELL, HOW LIFE
IMITATES THE WORLD SERIES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE GAME (1982). An alternative
would have been "Why Time Begins on Election Day." Cf. THOMAS BOSWELL, WHY
TIME BEGINS ON OPENING DAY (1984). Thanks to John McGinnis and Chuck Yablon for
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 So one would infer, for example, from the recent publication of a new review of
three books on the electoral college that were all published three decades ago. See Ann
Althouse, Electoral College Reform: Dejd Vu, 95 Nw. L. REV. 993 (2001) (reviewing
JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE
OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1971); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND
CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
(1971); LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL
COLLEGE REFORM (1972)).
2 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often
by enslaving it.").
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Series took place in 1960, when the Pittsburgh Pirates prevailed,
four games to three, over the mighty New York Yankees. The
sweet and stunning victory came on Bill Mazeroski's solo home
run in the bottom of the ninth inning of the seventh game, ranked
by The Sporting News as the second greatest moment in the history
of baseball.^ In their four victories, the Pirates outscored the
Yankees by a total of seven runs, winning 6-4, 3-2, 5-2, and 10-9.
In their three losses, the Pirates were outscored by 35 runs, losing
16-3, 10-0, and 12-0. Overall, the Yankees outscored the Pirates
55-27; as a team they hit .338 to the Pirates' .256; they had 10 home
runs to the Pirates' 4; Yankees pitchers had a collective ERA of
3.54, the Pirates' ERA was 7.11. In short, the Yankees dominated
by every measure except the one that counted: total games won.
This striking result even produced a moderately well-known Yogiism: "We made too many wrong mistakes.""
Although the gap was not as great, the Yankees/Pirates
scenario was repeated four decades later—^not when the Yankees
beat the Mets in the 2000 Series,^ but the following month when
George Bush beat A1 Gore in the 2000 presidential election. Bush
received 50,456,062 votes (47.89 percent). Gore 50,996,582 (48.4
percent). Despite having half a million fewer runs than his
opponent. Bush won the election because he won more games.®
Defenders of the electoral college regularly invoke the World
Series in general, and the 1960 World Series in particular.' In part.
3 See RON SMITH, THE SPORTING NEWS SELECTS BASEBALL'S 25 GREATEST
MOMENTS 20 (1999). Number one is Bobby Thompson's shot heard 'round the world.
But see Murray Qiass, Just How Loud Was 'The Shot', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at D12
(placing Mazeroski's home run first and Thompson's second on a list of the ten "most
meaningful" home runs in history); see also Tim Cowlishaw, Mazeroski Gets Due, but Will
His Feat?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8,2001, at IB (arguing that Mazeroski's home
nm was more dramatic and significant than Thompson's).
" YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: "I DIDN'T REALLY SAY EVERYTHING I SAID" 34
(1998); see also id. (noting that "there was no other way to explain how we ever lost that
series").
5 The Yankees took the 2000 Series 4 games to 1, a convincing, almost lopsided
victory. In total runs, however, they only outscored the Mets 19-16. Thus, the 2000 Series
is an example of the "magnifjdng effect" of tcdlying the results in distinct sub-components
of a larger overall contest. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
® This tabulation ignores, of course, controversy over the methods of counting votes in
Florida, Bush v. Gore, the butterfly ballot, allegations of voter fraud, and other claims that
would lead to the conclusion that Gore won by any definition. For present purposes
(indeed, for just about all purposes, really), it's the official version that counts; we will just
stipulate that it is contested.
' See, e.g., Proposals for Electoral College Reform- Hearings on H.J. Res. 28 and H.J.
Res. 43 Before the Subcomm on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 78 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 House Hearings] (questioning of Prof. Akhil
Amar by Rep. Robert C. Scott) ("I would ask Professor Amar whether you were outraged
when major league baseball awarded the New York Yankees last year's World Series,
when they scored 18 runs in the series and the Atlanta Braves scored 26 nms in the

THE ELECTORAL WORLD SERIES

2002]

1193

this reflects the irresistible allure of baseball metaphors,
particularly in legal scholarship, where one might almost identify a
"turn to baseball."^ But the World Series metaphor keeps popping
up in discussions about the electoral college not just because it is
neat and about sports; it is actually quite useful. Its usefulness is
my topic.
I.

PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
TO CREATE PLAUSIBILITY

Our modem intuitions about elections, formed in the post
Reynolds v. Sims,^ one-person-one-vote era, are (1) to determine
the winner we add up all the votes and see who has the most and
(2) all votes count equally. The electoral college is notoriously
inconsistent with these assumptions. First, the electoral college
does not add up the popular votes. It adds up the electoral votes,
and these are not necessarily the same. Almost every state
allocates electoral votes on a winner-take-all system, so the margin
of victory within each state is irrelevant to the overall outcome.
As in 2000, the popular vote winner can be the electoral college
loser. This looks weird. As Representative Ray LaHood (R. 111.),
a long-time electoral college opponent, puts it: "In our democracy,
if you mn for dogcatcher it's decided by popular vote.... The
only exception is the highest elected office in the country."'" For
LaHood, having the popular vote "overridden by the Electoral

series?"); Jeff Greenfield, The Hidden Beauty of the System, TIME, NOV. 20, 2000, at 66;
Andrea Neal, Electoral College Is More Bang for Buck, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, NOV. 23,
2000, at F2.
8 For examples of legal academics invoking baseball for analogies or insight, see EVA
H. HANKS ET AL.. ELEMENTS OF LAW 324-25 (1994); Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the
Rule of LMW, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 239 (1998); Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses
of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Richard Lempert, Error Behind the Plate and in the
Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 407 (1986); Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to
American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227 (1994); Robert M. Cover, Your Law-Baseball
Quiz, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,1979, at A23. A valuable collection of such writing, along with
articles and cases on substantive legal issues bearing on the game of baseball, is
BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (Spencer Webber Waller et al. eds., 1995).
There is even a small literature on the legitimacy of baseball analogies in legal writing. See
Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in
Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17 (1994); Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he
Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Baseball, Metaphors, and "The Sex Stuff, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 813 (19%).
' 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (adopting one-person, one-vote standard to require creation of
legislative districts of equal size).
'0 Albert R. Hunt, The Electoral College: Legitimate but Anachronistic, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 26,2000, at All (quoting Rep. Ray LaHood).
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College" amounts to a "major calamity.""
On the second point, votes would only be of equal weight it
electoral college votes were exactly apportioned among the states,
and then on the basis of those actually casting ballots rather than
population.
But in fact electoral votes are allocated by
p o p u l a t i o n s , w h i c h a r e n o t p e r f e c t m u l t i p l e s o f 435; t h e r a t e s o f
registration and of voting vary from one state to another, each
state, regardless of size, gets two electoral votes (corresponding to
its two Senators) in addition to the electoral votes allocated by
population (corresponding to its Representatives). The result, as
has often been pointed out, is a wide variation in the weight of
individual votes and a particular dilution of individual voting
strength in large states. So in 2000 Vermont had 97,931 1/3 voters
per elector; New York had 206,727 1/4 voters per elector. In this
sense, a Vermonter's vote counted twice as much as a New
Yorker's.'' This also looks odd at best, if not, in the words of
Senator Durbin, "undemocratic and unfair.'"' So the electoral
" M; see also 112 CONG. REC. 5928 (Mar. 15, 1966) (statement of Sen. Quentin
Burdick) (labeling the situation in which a President takes office after losing the popular
vote "a tragedy"); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM,
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 37 (1967) (concluding that a "national referendum is the only
"trulydemocraticprocess" forelectingthe President and Vice-President).
•. ,.
12 These figures are obtained by dividing each state's 2000 vote totals, as prodded by
the National Archives and Records Administration, by its number of electors. 5ee Nat 1
Archives & Records Admin., 2000 Presidential Election: Electoral Vote Results, at
http://www.nara.gOv/fedreg/elctcoll/2000res.html (last visited July 16, 2001). The more
usual calculation is not voters per elector but citizens per elector. Based on the 1990
census Vermont had 187,586 citizens per elector. New York 545,165; a difference of about
three to one. See id. (showing New York population of 17,990,455 and Vermont
population of 562,758). The difference between the per-citizen and the per-voter numbers
indieates a higher rate of voter registration and/or a higher rate of voting and/or a larger
percentage of voting-eligible residents in Vermont than in New York.
^ j
" 146 CONG. REC. 811,618-19 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (remarks of Sen. Richard
Durbin) It is often asserted that, because individual votes in small states are weightier in
this sense, the small states benefit from the electoral coUege; indeed, popular coverage of
the 2000 election focused almost exclusively on this purported bias in favor of small st^es.
See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Eramers, Federalism, and One
Person One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2548 & n.l09 (2001) (reporting that of 169
articles concerning the electoral college in the New York Times and the Washington Post
appearing between September 1, 2000 and April 1, 2001, twenty-eight reported a smallstate bias, one a large-state bias, and one conflicting small-state and large-state biases). In
fact, the small states' edge is rather theoretical. In every practical way, it is the larger
statk that benefit—they get the attention beeause they have the votes, and, almost always,
as go the large states, so goes the election. See, e.g.. The Electoral College arid Direct
Election of the President: Hearing on S.J. Res. 297, S.J. Res. 302, and S.J. Res. 312 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, m2d Cong. 8
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings] (prepared statement of Sen. David Pryor)
(contending that "simple electoral math dictates that the candidates spend all their time
campaigning in the eight to twelve largest states, because that is where the electoral prizes
are" and that the system "not only encourages, but mandates, campaigns in only big
states"). John Banzhaf was thought to have proved a large-state bias three decades ago.
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college conflicts with prevailing assumptions about elections. As
Senator Birch Bayh, another longtime opponent of the electoral
college, succinctly put it at the beginning of a hearing on his
proposal for direct election of the President:
[U]nless someone does a superhuman job of persuading, I am
going to remain convinced the direct election should replace
our present system, because direct election is the only system
that guarantees that every vote will count, that every vote will
count the same, and that the candidate with the most votes will
win.'"
The World Series metaphor speaks powerfully to the first, and
most salient, of these two aspects of the electoral college. (It has
something more indirect and complicated to add to our
understanding of the second, as I shall discuss below.). Electoral
college skeptics who assume the popular vote should determine
the winner have to stop and think when they first hear the World
Series metaphor. The electoral college seems odd; the World
Series seems sensible. But these two venerable institutions
operate in similar ways. The analogy works because it draws on
our learned intuitions about one thing, baseball, to make us think
differently about another thing, the electoral college, which seems
counter-intuitive.
So, the first value of the metaphor is that it lends plausibility;
it forces people to think more carefully; it lets them see that
perhaps the electoral college could (not does—^that's asking rather
a lot from a metaphor) make sense after all.
The World Series analogy should diminish concern over the
winner of the popular vote not becoming President in a second
way as well. Everyone understands and accepts that when a game
is set up according to certain rules, the players act strategically in
light of those rules. A manager who is trying to win the most
games will adopt different strategies than a manager trying to
see John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral
College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968), although his analysis has also been attacked, see,
e.g., Howard Margolis, The Banzhaf Fallacy, AM. POL. SCI. REV., Feb. 1983, at 321.
One reason the electoral college has survived the many efforts to abolish it may be
that both small and large states think it benefits them, even though they cannot both be
right. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 9-10; Estes Kefauver, The Electoral College: Old
Reforms Take on a New Look, 27 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 188, 1% (1%2) (noting that
"[tjhere were instances in our hearings where a witness would dismiss the practical
chances of direct national election proposals as depriving the small states of their electoral
vote advantage and then attack the present system as favoring the large states over the
smaller ones").
Direct Popular Election of the President and Vice President of the United States:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 28 Before the Subcomm on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2-3 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Hearings] (opening statement
of Sen. Birch Bayh).
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score the most runs—a sacrifice bunt or a defensive replacement in
the late innings of a close game makes sense if it is important to
win games, but does not if all that matters is total runs. It is
impossible to look at the results of a contest played under one set
of rules and know what would have happened under a different set
of rules, because the game would not have been played the same
wayApplied to the presidential elections, the point is that we do
not know who would have won the most total votes if total votes
were what the candidates were trying to maximize. Invoking the
World Series (of course), John McGinnis makes this point:
[T]he popular vote result has no electoral meaning because the
candidates were not in a contest for the popular vote. If they
had been seeking the highest popular vote, they would have
campaigned entirely differently. George Bush would have
campaigned more in Texas to run up his vote and A1 Gore
would have campaigned more in California. Both would have
campaigned more in urban areas because it is easier to turn out
the vote there. They would have run their television
advertisements in different places and perhaps even run
different advertisements altogether. Given the less than four
tenths of a percentage point difference between Bush and Gore,
we cannot be certain who would have won the popular vote
Accordingly, it is not entirely coherent to label those instances
in which the college winner loses the popular vote as
"misfirings" of the electoral college.^^

Speaking before the 2000 election, and anticipating a possible
Gore victory in the electoral college and loss of the popular vote,
Walter Delhnger made precisely the same argument in rejecting
the claim that such an outcome would undermine the winner's
legitimacy: "There's no real legitimacy argument.
If the
presidency was decided by the popular vote, the two candidates
would have run different races. We simply don't know who would
have won."^®
This is inescapably true, at least for a relatively close election
such as that of 2000 (or 1888 or 1876). This is not to say that the
campaign incentives that the electoral college creates are the right
John O. McGinnis, Popular Sovereignty and the Electoral College, 29 FLA. ST. L.
REV. 995, 996 (2001). For further development of the point, with a reference to the 1960
World Series, see Michael Albert, Election Issues: Money, Structure, Manipulation, and the
Electoral College, ZNET DAILY COMMENTARIES (NOV. 13, 2000), at
http://www.lbbs.org/ZSustainers/ZDaily/ 2000-ll/13albert.htm.
16 Hunt, supra note 10, at A27 (quoting Walter Delhnger); see also Althouse, supra
note 1, at 1012-13. The outcome in a particular state being a foregone conclusion will
affect not only the candidate's strategy, but also voter turnout. Supporters and opponents
alike may stay at home because they view their votes as purely symbolic.
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ones. But the system creates certain incentives, and given those
incentives we cannot know what the outcome would have been
under a different set of rules; therefore the inconsistency between
electoral and popular vote outcomes should bother us less than it
otherwise would." The analogy to the World Series is useful
because it helps make all this clear by invoking a setting where
exactly the same dynamic operates and is understood and
accepted.
II.

THE ACTUAL, THOUGH ALSO HELPFUL,
INACCURACY OF THE ANALOGY

In fact, the electoral college is not like the World Series,
despite what everyone says. In the World Series, all games count
equally. In the electoral college, state votes are weighted. A
state's electoral vote total is a function of, though not perfectly
proportionate to, its population. The smallest states have three
electoral votes; the biggest, California, has fifty-five. The closer
analogy to the World Series, then, is the process by which the
House selects the President and the Senate the Vice-President if
the electoral college fails to produce a majority: one state, one
vote.'® That system is a far greater departure from the just-countthe-votes principle than is the electoral college.
Interestingly, the World Series/12th Amendment model is a
far greater departure on paper than in practice. The winner of the
electoral college has almost always also won a majority of the
states. The two exceptions were 1976, when Ford took twentyseven states and Carter twenty-four, and 1960, when Nixon took
twenty-five states, Kennedy twenty-two, and Byrd two, with
Kennedy and Byrd splitting each of the remaining four." In other
words, only twice has the difference between the World
Series/12th Amendment approach and the electoral college
approach actually made a difference in the outcome.^"
" The point holds in the other direction, but more weakly. That is, because no
candidate was trying to maximize total votes, we should not be reassured when the
electoral college winner is also the popular vote winner. Perhaps if the dual loser had
been trying to maximize popular votes, he could have done so, even though an electoral
college victory was out of reach.
'8 See U.S. CONST, amend. XII ("But in choosing the President, the votes shall be
taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote
").
" Of course, in the three elections in which the electoral college chose the popular
vote loser—2000, 1888, 1876—it was the popular vote loser who won a majority of the
states. So there have been five elections in which the popular vote winner would have lost
in a true "World Series" system.
2" The fact that the overall winner nearly always wins an actual majority of the states is
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Although this difference has rarely been of consequence in
presidential elections, it is significant nonetheless. The one-stateone-vote rule has been roundly criticized. Consider James
Madison:
[W]ith all possible abatements the present rule of voting for
President by the H. of Reps, is so great a departure from the
Republican principle of numerical equality, and even from the
federal rule which qualifies the numerical by a State equality,
and is so pregnant also with a mischievous tendency in practice,
that an amendment of the Constitution on this point is justly
called for by all its considerate & best friends.^'

With Sanford Levinson leading the attack, modem writers
have also been fiercely critical.^^ But the point is that they are
attacking not the electoral college, but the fall-back provision for
selection by the House. To use Madison's terms, the electoral
college is an example of the "federal rule." While that is shy of the
"Republican principle of numerical equaUty," it is quite different
from the World Series/12th Amendment model of counting all
games equally. The World Series analogy usefully reminds us that
the electoral college is tied to the popular vote in a way that it
an almost complete response to the objection that one defect of the electoral college is
that someone could become President by winning only a dozen or so of the biggest states.
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 233 (Michael Nelson ed.,
1989) (pointing out that winning twelve states could bring a candidate overall victory); 125
CONG. REC. 5182 (Mar. 15,1979) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) ("[A] candidate can win
the Presidency by carrying the electoral votes of only 11 states. Yet, surely, no one would
want to see a President who felt particularly obligated to represent the attitudes of only
those States or even appear to so represent."). Like many of the unacceptable outcomes
the electoral college could produce, such a scenario is altogether theoretical. It is hard to
imagine a real world candidate who is consistently, but exclusively, popular in the larger
states.
Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), reprinted in 3 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 557 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
22 With typical bluntness, Levinson writes:
Why in the world should the House of Representatives vote by state instead of
by member? Even if one rejects... [the] denunciations of the Senate's
malapportionment, it seems inexplicable that anyone would accept, let alone
glory in, the possibility that a majority of state delegations in the House of
Representatives, representing far less than a majority of the national population,
would inflict their choice upon the rest of the country.
Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST. COMM.
183,185-86 (1995). See also 138 CONG. REC. S7993 (daily ed. June 11,1992) (remarks of
Sen. Slade Gorton) (introducing constitutional amendment to provide for a run-off in case
no candidate has a majority in the electoral college and observing that "I do not
exaggerate when I say that I tremble for the future of our country and its system of
government when I imagine the reaction of the American people if Congress, under the
current 12th amendment, chose someone for President who had not received the most
votes"); Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?,
29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 925, 970 (2001) (labeling the one-state, one-vote rule the
Amendment's "ultimate stupidity").
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need not necessarily be, and in which the World Series is not tied
to total runs. Though the electoral college looks like an aberrant
institution, it is not as wacky as it might be.
III.

SALVAGING

THE ANALOGY

Notwithstanding its weighted approach, the electoral colbge
does of course operate something like the World Senes. While
electoral votes are tied to population, the electoral vote does not
duplicate the popular vote. Almost always, the divergence
increases the gap between the two candidates; m general, a modest
edee in the popular vote translates into a much more significant
advantage in the electoral college." But the fact that electoral
votes d o not track popular votes also can conceivably result m m
electoral college tally closer than the popular votes^'^ or, as m 20UU,
in the popular vote winner losing the electoral college.
The divergence of popular and electoral votes has four basic
causes. First, and most important, voting is by (state-\Nade)
districts, and forty-eight states have adopted the "umt rule, or
winner-take-all approach to picking electors. Wmner-take-all
districting allows one side to win a bunch of districts narrowly, lose
a smaller number grandly, and end up with an electoral coltege (or
legislative) majority despite having fewer popular votes. Ca the
games of the 1960 Worlds Series legislative districts, and call the
Yankees and Pirates political parties, and one sees how a party or
a candidate that receives only a third of the total votes can still
have a majority in the state legislature, or the state's congressional
delegation, or the electoral college." Were every state to adopt
23 For example, in 1988 George Bush defeated Michael Dukakis by 53.4 percent to
45.6 percent in the popular vote and 426 (79 percent) to ill (21 percent in the e ectord
colle^. More dramatically, in 1912 Woodrow Wilson had 42 percent of Je poputo wte
but 82 percent of the electoral vote. LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE TUE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, at 183, 186, app. A (1999). Defenders of the
electoral college see this "magnifying effect" as one of its strengths, arguing that the^g^r
margin of victory legitimizes the result in the eyes of the voters. See
Diamond, The Electoral College and the American Idea of Det^cracy, in AFTER THE
PEOPLE VOTE: A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 44,61-62 (Walter Bems ed., rev.
ed. 1992)
TOs
is thus
No candidate
inis lb
UlUb far
lai only
uill^ a
a theoretical possibility.
.
1
L - Jj- - - -the popular vote and the electoral college has had a wider margin

who
m both
. , prevailed
rfrvrmpr than
In
the
in the former than the

25 The possibility of a particular party gaining a majonty of votes but a minority of
seats within the legislature or within the state's congressional delegation seeim to bother
people less than the winner of the popular vote not being President It
of
lhat the accumulation of such results can mean that the composition of the Hof ® of
Representatives as a whole conflicts with national vote totals. And the possibility
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the proportional approach used in Maine and Nebraska, this effect
would be diluted but not eliminated since (a) two electors would
still be selected state-wide in each state and (b) selection would
still be by districts, just smaller ones, so a state's slate of electors
would be disproportionate to total votes if electors for one
candidate win narrowly and lose grandly district by district.
Second, the electoral votes are not allocated exactly m
proportion to population. For one thing, every state gets two votes
(corresponding to its two Senators) regardless of size. In those
states with only a single representative, especially those with a
population less than that of the theoretical ideal House district, an
electoral college vote represents many fewer popular votes than m
larger states.^*^ At the extremes, Wyoming has 165,101 people per
electoral vote; California has 616,924.''
In addition, state
populations are not all perfect multiples of l/435th of the total
number of U.S. citizens. Therefore the citizens per representative
ratio (and so citizens per electoral vote) varies from state to state.
an outcome is built in to the two-per-state structure of the Senate. The electoral college's
potential for disparity between the outcome and the popular vote totals tto looks hke
more of an aberration than it is. See Diamond, supra note 23, at 53-55 (askmg,
rhetorically, "fwlhy is it not a loaded pistol to our democratic heads when control over om
lawmaking bodies can fall, and has fallen, into the hands of the party that lost m the
national popular vote?" and stressing the advantages that flow from districted elections).
26 Interestingly, the two "senatorial" votes have almost never made a difference in the
outcome of an election. Had each state had the same number of electoral votes that it to
representatives, the outcome in every election but two would have been the saine. ^e
first time the senatorial votes mattered was m 1916, when Woodrow Wil^n defeated
Charles Evan Hughes by a margin of twenty-three electoral votes, 277-254. The etoord
vote gap represents the senatorial votes from twelve states. Wilson earned exactly twelve
more states than Hughes did. Tlius, had each state had only the number of electoral votes
as it had representatives, the gap would have been narrowed by twenty-four votes, and

Hughes would have won by one vote.

The second time the senatorial votes mattered was in 2000. George Bushcarned
thirty states; A1 Gore took twenty-one (including the District of Columbia), ^ats a
difference of nine, or eighteen senatorial votes. Bush needed almost aU of them,
prevailing 271-267. (The official tally was 271-266 as one Gore elector abstamed in
protest; throughout this Article I treat Gore as having won 267 electoral votes.)
Note also that, because many factors other than the existence of senatonal votes can
contribute to a variance between the electoral vote and the popular vot^he senatonal
votes do not necessarily create that variance; they may eliminate it. In 2000, the popui^
vote would have aligned with the electoral vote but for the senatonal votes. But in 1916,
the two were aligned because of the senatorial votes. Wilson took the ppular vote,
9,131,511 (49.3 percent) to 8,548,935 (46.1 percent). Without the senatonal votes, the
popular vote winner would have been the electoral college loser.
A
22 The 2000 census shows Wyoming's "apportionment population to be 495,304 and
Cahfomia's to be 33,930,798.
U.S. Dep't of Commerce U.S^ Censi^m^u
Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, by State: Census 2m (2lWi)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Commerce], available at http://www.census.gov/population
/cen2000/tab01.pdf (last visited July 16, 2001). Wyoming has three electoral votes,
California fifty-five.
. . T. n
u o,,.
28 A stark example of this disparity gave rise to an unsuccessful challenge by the state
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The third cause of disparity between popular and electoral
votes is that states vary in their rates of registration, of voting by
registered voters, and of voting-eligible citizens within their
population. For the electoral college to reproduce the results of a
direct popular election, electoral votes would have to be allocated
not by population but by voters?""
Finally, while total population and total voters are of course
connected, the population figures that form the basis of the
allocation are out of date the first time they are used, and
increasingly so in subsequent elections. For example, if electoral
votes in the 2000 election were allocated according to the
population figures of the 2000 census, George Bush would have
an electoral college margin of 278-260.^°
^
,
These factors are familiar and well-understood. At first blush
it is odd that there have been so few instances in which the
electoral college winner was the popular vote loser, given t e
numerous ways in which the allocation of electoral votes fads to
correspond with actual votes. The explanation is three-fold. First
these factors will only matter in very close elections, and most
elections are not very close. Second, the most important of these
factors is the unit rule, which generally magnifies rather than
eliminates the gap between winner and loser. Third, as we have
seen, these different features can cancel each other out. For
example, in 1916, Wdson won because of the Senatorial votes;
without them, the unit rule would have led to a victory for Hughes,
of Montana to the method of allocating representatives. See Uiiited States Dep^ of
Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992). Tlie 1990 census gave the total popdation^
249 022783; thus an "ideal" congressional district would have been home to 5724^
people (i e 249 022,783 ^ 435). Montana was given a single House seat for its population
S m 655- a district that was 231,189 people larger than the ideal. (It unsuccessfi^y
argued that it should have been given two seats, which would have
f
each 170,638 persons smaller than the ideal but closer to it than the
given.) In contrast, in Alaska, Vermont, and Wyoming, the three
tot^
^pulations below that of the ideal district, every vote
national average. Id. at 463. Wyoming's "apportionment population m the 1990 census
was 455,975, making its citizens' votes almost twice as strong as those of Montanans.
29 For an illustration, see supra note 12 and accompanymg text.
30 The Census Bureau's apportionment tables ^how shifts m the follown^
1990 to 2000 (2000 victor is indicated parenthetically): ArKona
(Gore) +1- Colorado (Bush) +1; Connecticut (Gore) -1; Honda (Bush) +2 Geopa
(Bush) +2; Illinois (Gore) -1; Indiana (Bush) -1; VficWgan (Gore) -1;
Nevada (Bush) +1; New York (Gore) -2; North Carolina (Bush) +1, Oluo (Bush) -1,
Oklahoma (Bush) -1; Pennsylvania (Gore) -2; Texas (Bush) +2; Wisconsin (Gore) 4. See
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 27. While these shifts com^unded the
electoral college and popular votes, the movement easily could have been m the other
direction- the point is only that the out of date census figures reduce the accuracy of the
proportional allocations of electoral votes. (Interestingly, the ei^teen-vom naargin would
J^es^nd exactly to Bush's edge in Senatorial votes; a purely proportional electoral
college would have produced a tie under these numbers.)
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the popular vote loser. Thus, one divergence from pure
proportionality offset another. Similarly, if in 2000 Gore had won,
say. New Hampshire, giving him a bare electoral college majority
to go with his popular majority, then we might have said that the
inaccuracies caused by obsolete census data balanced out the
inaccuracies produced by the unit rule, preserving the electoral
college victory for the popular vote winner.
In any event, these four factors preclude exact proportionality
between electoral college and popular votes and so explain
outcomes like that of 2000, when the popular vote winner loses the
election.
They make the World Series analogy plausible
notwithstanding its imperfections.
IV.

SPINNING OUT THE ANALOGY

Accepting that the World Series analogy applies, the question
then becomes whether it is useful. I think it is, because it helps us
to ask the right question about the electoral college and it helps us
to understand its operation and consequences. In baseball, a game
is a relevant unit. Under the rules, assumptions, and structures of
baseball, it makes sense to proceed game by game when
determining the champion. The World Series analogy implicitly
asserts that in presidential elections a state is a relevant unit. The
question becomes why games matter in baseball, and whether
there are equivalent reasons for making states matter in
presidential elections.
A.

Maybe Games Don't Matter in Baseball

It could be, of course, that games don't matter in baseball—or,
more precisely, that the choice to proceed game by game (rather
than inning by inning, or adding up total runs, or total hits, or total
bases, or by giving zero points for a strike out, one point for a ball
hit in the infield, two for a ball to the outfield and three for what
we now call a "hit") is wholly arbitrary. Baseball, like all games, is
a self-contained collection of random and meaningless rules. So
viewed, baseball is a setting in which we are concerned only with
what John Rawls calls "pure procedural justice."^^ In such a
system, we do not know, or have abandoned the effort to define,
the correct outcome; instead, whatever outcome the process
31 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971).
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produces is by definition fair. Rawls's example is gambling: the
outcome of a spin of the roulette wheel cannot be justified other
than by the fact that it was the result of certain procures, but
that alone is enough to make the outcome just. This model,
however, is inappropriate for elections, where the correct
outcome can be described according to an independent,
substantive criterion. The exact nature of that criterion is a matter
of debate; for present purposes it suffices to say that elections
should "promote democracy," or accurately express popular
preference. The task is to devise procedures that will accomplish
that goal, that will reach the correct outcome. In devising electoral
schemes, we seek what Rawls calls "perfect procedural justwe,
understanding that the best we can hope for is imperfect
procedural justice"^^ (as in, to use Rawls's example, the criminal
trial] By definition, procedures developed in a settmg of pure
procedural justice can hold no lessons when we seek to achieve
perfect (or even imperfect) procedural justice, i.e. when there is an
external standard by which to evaluate the correctness of the
This argument is a powerful one, and I will return to it in the
conclusion. However, it does not entirely undercut the value of
the World Series analogy. Unlike, say, roulette, where the only
meaningful criterion for identifying a victor is that the victor was
produced by agreed-upon arbitrary rules, baseball ^ovides a set of
procedures to identify the better baseball team. To be sure, the
goal is not to identify the team that is better m any larger sense
moral, inteUectual, popular—but just to identify the team that is
better at baseball. Thus, we risk tautology. Being better at
baseball" is not an external standard; what could it mean other
than the ability to win baseball games? Nonetheless, there ^a
difference between a game of skill and a game of chance, ^e
rules of baseball are designed to give victory to the team with the
full range of skills that go into baseball; the fact that those skills
are arbitrarily selected (why throwing and not kicking?) does not
mean that the rules themselves are arbitrary. Like law generally,
they must be coherent and make sense within the limited contex
in which they apply. They are refined in light of the felt
necessities of the time" (the strike zone changes, the height of the
mound is adjusted, aluminum bats are allowed m college but not m
the majors, etc.) and receive constant scrutiny from an engaged
A separate but related objection would be that the rules of
32 Id.
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games are by their nature not only arbitrary but trivial', because the
stakes are so low, we can live with all sorts of oddities in the rules
of sports that would be intolerable in other settings. Soccer
players cannot use their hands; we would not tolerate that rule
Lgeons. It is wrongheaded to transplant approaches adopted in
sSs where it doe?not matter to settings where it matters very
much indeed. Professor Akhil Amar made this argument when
pressed on the World Series analogy dunng congressional
testimony:
Mr. [Robert C] SCOTT [R. Va.]: I would ask Professor Amar
whether you were outraged when
awarded the New York Yankees last year s [i.e. the 1996J
World Series, when they scored 18 runs in the senes and the
Atlanta Braves scored 26 runs in the series?
Mr. [Walter] BERNS: He does not know anything about
baseball.
Mr. AMAR; I know a lot about baseball, Walter. Arid one of
the things I know is that, although it is the great Amencan
pastime, at the end of the day, wait until iiext year, it does not
matter very much who wins the World Senes. So the
arbitrariness of certain rules that define a game is less troubling
if, in the end, the game is just a game.'^
Amar's point is well-taken, but it is not a complete response
(indeed, it was not his complete response during that testimony as
I will discuss below). First, if the question is not what matters m
some ultimate sense, but instead what matters to people, the World
Series ranks pretty high—higher, for some, than the
election. Many baseball fans, the politically apathetic ^d
alienated, and Ralph Nader would all counter Ainar ^gjhat
what does not matter very much is who becomes President. Mo
important, a lack of consequences does not necessarily produce an
iZherenl system. Amarl surely right that arbhrarmess or e^
is easy to live with in inconsequential settings. But that does not
mean that arbitrariness and error characterize mconsequenti^
settings. Within the artifiaal and arbitrary system that a game
creates, the component rules must have some sort of coherence
and sense. And it is at least possible that that coherence and sense
can be applied to other settings.

33 1997 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 78.
3^ Unless it's Ralph Nader.
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Counting Games Ensures that Victory Is Not a Fluke

The World Series runs seven games and the season 162 in
order to control against the chance that a team's victo^ in a single
game was a fluke. A funny bounce, the ball that goes just over the
outfield wall or just out of reach of the infielder's glove, the
superstar pitcher's only wild pitch of the season, and the like can
produce a result in an individual game that is inconsistent with the
actual relative strengths of the two teams. While this is indeed a
justification for a World Series (at least one of those words is
accurate), it has no bearing on the electoral college. The analogy
to a one-game World "Series" would be having one state elect the
President. Not surprisingly, that proposal is not on the table.
Moreover, the choice between counting total runs and
counting total games in a series has nothing to do with avoiding
flukes. It was not at all a fluke that the Yankees scored mores runs
than the Pirates in 1960. They had Mickey Mantle and Roger
Maris and Moose Skowron; of course they scored more runs. And
it is not a fluke if one Presidential candidate receives more total
votes than the other. So this just returns us to the original
question—^why would we deny victory to the candidate/team with
more votes/runs?
C.

Discounting Unusually Large Victories

One reason to count games is that to sum total runs would
give too much weight to a team's overwhelming success in a single
game. Many have invoked the World Series or other sports
analogies to argue that direct election of the President would
similarly overvalue a candidate's enormous success in his home
state or elsewhere where that candidate is unusually popular.
They make three overlapping points.
1.

Overcounting Narrow Talents or Support

In baseball, overwhelming victories are misleading. Maybe a
team is just "on" one day, or it is beating up on the other team's
only bad pitcher, or, the game having been lost, the losing manager
takes out his best players to avoid injury. Counting a blowout
equally with a squeaker avoids overvaluing this isolated and
misleading triumph. That a team had a particular advantage on a
given day does not mean it is a better team altogether. Proceeding
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game by game minimizes the advantage resulting from that
momentary edge.
By the same token, if a candidate is
overwhelmingly but uniquely popular in a single state, that does
not mean he is a "better" candidate overall. In 2000, for example,
George Bush surely could have done better in Texas than he did.
Because the state was comfortably his, he did not need to
campaign extensively there. Had he paid more attention to his
home state because what counted was total votes, we might be
unimpressed that he won a national election on the strength of
intense local popularity. This point turns the usual complaint
about the non-national character of the electoral college on its
head, suggesting that the electoral college ensures broad national
appeal by discounting intense local popularity.
One author makes the point this way:
In sports, we accept that a true champion should be more
consistent than the 1960 Yankees. A champion should be able
to win at least some of the tough, close contests by every means
available—^bunting, stealing, brilliant pitching, dazzling plays in
the field—and not just smack home runs against second-best
pitchers. A presidential candidate worthy of office, by the same
logic, should have broad appeal across the whole nation, and
not just play strongly on a single issue to isolated blocs of
voters."

For supporters of the electoral college, this is the moral of
Benjamin Harrison's victory over Grover Cleveland in 1888, the
last time, before 2000, that the winner of the popular vote lost the
presidency. The standard account is that Cleveland ran a oneissue campaign, supporting a reduction in tariffs that was
extremely popular in the South but nowhere else. Cleveland beat
Harrison so emphatically in the South that he prevailed in the
popular vote, but Harrison, with broader appeal, won everywhere
else, handily taking the electoral college 233-168.^ For supporters
of the electoral college, 1888 shows the strength of the system, not
Will Hively, Math Against Tyranny, DISCOVER, Nov. 1996, at 80 (discussing the
work of MIT physicist Alan Natapoff).
^ See, e.g., JUDITH A. BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE? DEBATING THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE 25-26 (19%). Harrison received 5,445,269 votes (47.8 percent) to
Qeveland's 5,540,365 (48.6 percent); two other candidates totaled 404,205 popidar, and no
electoral, votes. LXINGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 23, at 182. The standard accoimt is in
fact somewhat misleading; Cleveland's support was not quite so narrow and deep as all
that. Cleveland took the entire South, plus New Jersey and Connecticut; Harrison took
the remaining northern states and such western states as existed at the time (Cahfomia,
Oregon, Colorado). Cleveland took eighteen states, Harrison nineteen. Thus, support
was quite evenly divided geographically. What really hurt Qeveland in the electoral
college was not that he won only a few states—he did not—but that he lost all five of the
biggest states (including the biggest, his home state of New York).
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its weakness. Of course, the real impact of the system is seen not
in the isolated instance viewed ex post, but in the constant ex ante
incentives it creates for the parties in selecting candidates, for the
candidates in campaigning, and for the President in governing.
The system selects for those with broad geographic appeal, just as
the World Series tends to select for team with a range of skills and
strength through the lineup.
Indeed, there is a direct "geographic" aspect to the World
Series. Teams are sometimes built to take advantage of
peculiarities of the home ballpark. Also, most teams enjoy a home
field advantage unrelated to talent. The World Series is set up to
minimize these advantages; the team with three games (assuming a
seven-game series) at home must win at least one game in its
opponent's park; the team with four games at home might
conceivably only prevail at home, but it is impossible, given the
need for an odd number of total games, to avoid that. As a result,
the winning team must have some success away from its home
field. Spectacular success at home—^which might reflect only a
narrow set of talents or factors other than talent (fan support,
being able to sleep in one's own bed, psychological comfort,
etc.)—does not amount to more than it should. Obviously, there's
no precise equation for determining how much success at home
"should" count, but the win-games approach is a rough proxy for
that idea.
2.

Not Running Up the Score

The second reason to minimize the potential gain from a
single contest that might be applicable to both the World Series
and the electoral college concerns the incentives that the total
games approach creates. Candidates focus on the states that are in
play; they do not waste time and resources in states where victory
is safe or impossible. Using football rather than baseball (but the
point is the same), Judith Best explains:
[F]ootball coaches don't try to run up the score in a game they
have good reason to believe they have already won . . . [and]
they don't leave in their starting quarterback and great fullback
when they are ahead late in the fourth quarter by at least three
touchdowns. These essential players might get hurt for nothing,
and thus running up the score in this game may cost them
victory in other games. It is more important to win other games
than to boast of beating this team by five touchdowns. Coaches
know the rules for getting into the Super Bowl; they know that
trying to run up the score in this game could result in hurting
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their chances to win in other games. Candidates and political
parties know the same kind of thing in presidential elections,
they do know the rules of the electoral vote system; they will try
to win the most states rather than a few states by overwhelming
margins.'^
As discussed above, because no one is trying to maximize the
popular vote, tabulations of the popular votes are far from a
conclusive indicator of whom a majority of American ^o^ers
prefers. But here the point is normative: the system should
prevent candidates from capitalizing on local advantages. Breadth
of support, or talent, is as important as depth. Knowing nothing
was to be gained in Texas, George Bush directed his attention
elsewhere and became President only because he was able to find
sufficient support when he did so.
3.

Every Game Is Different

A third justification for proceeding game by game in baseball
is that every game is different. The critical importance of the
pitcher has a lot to do with this. But, in addition, each game has its
own particular shape and developments. Teams cannot store up
hits or runs because hits and runs do not have the same meaning
the next day.
...
r ,
x ^ ^
This notion of course resonates with defenses of the electoral
college that look to the principle of federalism. On this account,
the strength of the electoral college is that it
forces presidential candidates to build broad cross-national
political coalitions. Thereby it produces presidents who can
govern because of their broad cross-national support. In
politics as well as in physics there is such a thing as a critical
mass. In presidential elections numbers of votes are necessary
but not sufficient. To create the critical mass necessary for a
president to govern, his votes must be properly distributed.
This means he must win states and win states in more than one
region of the country.
If we abandon the federal principle in presidential elections we
will be abandoning a national consensus building device by
allowing candidates to promise everything to the populous
Eastern megalopolis, or to promise everything to wlute
Christians, or to suburbanites who are now half of all voters.
BEST, supra note 36, at 25.
J U A D
38 2997 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 25 (prepared statement of Judith A. Best); see
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Supporters of federalism tend to be supporters of the electoral
college; federalism skeptics tend to be electoral college skeptics.
In an editorial following the 2000 election, The New York Times
invoked federalism in arguing for retention of the electoral college
thus:
The Electoral College ... was and is one of those safeguards of
a balanced federalism—^much like the allocation of two senators
to each state, regardless of size. And by offering the promise
that even the smallest states could tip the balance in close
elections, the system made it impossible to ignore them. This,
in tum, required presidential candidates to build alliances
across ideological and geographical lines.
It is true, as the system's critics suggest, that the rise of mass
communications and modem transportation has knit the
country together in ways unforeseen by the founders. But that
does not mean that we are one homogeneous, undifferentiated
mass, at least not yet. There are still definably Midwestern
interests, or Northwestem interests, as opposed to, say. Eastern
interests. There are still definably rural interests, just as there
are urban interests.^'
The World Series analogy perhaps helps in evaluating this
argument. Again, in the World Series it is understood that a game
is a relevant unit. The question is whether a state is a relevant unit
when we elect the President. Two steps should be distinguished:
(1) dividing the nation into districts, and then (2) drawing the
district boundaries along state lines. The Times's argument
supports the first step but undercuts the second. Districting can
require that a candidate appeal to more than just a single, majority
eonstituency (unless that large constituency is spread evenly
through all districts). But the Times says nothing about why
district lines should be drawn along state boundaries. Indeed, its
own rationale suggests they should not. If different interests are
what matter, then the districts ought to encompass discrete
interests; the boundaries might be regional (Midwestern versus
Eastern), or rural versus urban, or not geographical at all. If, or
also 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 34 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond)
(stating that direct election of the president would be "completely incompatible with
federalism"); id. at 358 (statement of Theodore White) (stating, in arguing against direct
election of the President, that "[njothing any of you can ever do could be more disastrous
than undermining the Federal System of the United States, the association of proud
communities and states who make ours the wonderful, difficult, and mysterious country it
is"); id. at 361 (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson) (arguing that the "federal system," in
which voters participate in national elections only through their states, is "highly
beneficial," and that ''state voting power is more important" than "the voting power of
individuals"). See generally Diamond, supra note 23, at 51-56.
Editorial, The Case for the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,2000, at A34.
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when, Internet voting becomes secure and reliable, districts could
be drawn along the lines of profession, or wealth, or any sel^
selected criterion; people could set up their own districts, which
others would be allowed to join until they are full. Such ideas no
doubt would have many shortcomings. But the basic point is that
state boundaries are very, and increasingly, artificial. Much more
than in 1787, and increasingly as time goes on, they do not define
communities of interest. As the Times implies, a New York yuppie
and a Chicago yuppie, or a rural New York farmer and an Illmois
farmer, have more in common than do the two New Yorkers or
the two Illinoisans.
.
.
This view is of course contested. That is a discussion tor
another day, with consequences far beyond the electoral college.
And, as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine ignoring state lines
in drawing districts for presidential elections. For histoncal
reasons, if nothing else, districts will continue to reflect state
boundaries. It may therefore be enough to argue for a distncted
system, with the understanding that such a system would perforce
follow state lines. For present purpose, the only point is that the
World Series analogy, and much writing about the electoral
college, argues for districting but is silent as to whether the district
boundaries should be state boundaries.
D.

Increasing the Impact of Individual Performance

The World Series analogy has one more aspect. Proceeding
game by game increases the chances that any particular player will
make a critical contribution to the outcome. Bill Mazeroski stands
out as the hero of the 1960 World Series because he contributed
the most important hit; but it was important only because he came
up at the right time—^a moment when a single hit could determine
the outcome of the entire contest, which had come down to a
single game. The win-games approach has allowed many players
to make absolutely critical contributions—^not always ones that the
players or the fans cherish the way they do Mazeroski's home run.
The inglorious individual contributions of Fred Merkle, Micky
Owen,^^ and Bill Buckner^^ were made possible by the same
isolation and heightened impact of the individual action that made
"•O The 26th greatest moment, according to The Sporting News. See SPORTING NEWS,
The 10 Next Greatest Moments, at http;//tsn.sportingnews.conVbaseball/25moments/
nextl0.html (last visited July 3,2001).
^
Number 23 on The Sporting News's list. SMITH, supra note 3, at loo.
« Number 8 (ridiculously) for The Sporting News. Id. at 60.
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Mazeroski's home run what it was. Such circumstances arise only
because to win the World Series a team must win four separate
games, not just score the most amount of runs. A single run,
scored at the right time in the right game, can change the whole
outcome. So can a single mistake, made at just the wrong time in
just the wrong game. (That is the nuance of Yogi Berra's wiserthan-it-seems remark about making the "wrong mistakes.")"^ The
odds that a single run or a single mistake will have such an impact
are far smaller if we just add up total runs; under that approach
Mazeroski's home run is irrelevant.
The same dynamic operates with regard to districted
elections. By subdividing the electorate and adding votes within
these subdivisions, the odds that a single vote, or group of votes,
will change the outcome greatly increase. For a single vote, or
voting bloc, to affect the outcome, the election must be closely
contested. The smaller the district, the more likely it will be close.
This may not be a good thing. Critics of the electoral college
decry how minute changes in votes cast could have changed many
election outcomes (and produced a divergence between the
popular and electoral vote winners)
So, for example, if 1,983
voters in California had voted for Hughes rather than Wilson in
1916, Hughes would have won the election; a change of 11,424
votes, across five states, would have given Richard Nixon the
White House in 1960; and a shift of 9,246 votes in Hawaii and Ohio
would have sufficed for Gerald Ford to defeat Jimmy Carter in
1976."' These possibilities are in the nature of a districted, stateby-state system, just as they are in the nature of a win-games
system for the World Series.
For electoral college critics, it seems self-evident that having
election results hinge on such narrow differences is problematic.
(In general, these arguments begin with the premise that it is
unacceptable for the popular vote winner not to become President;
The more obvious and direct legal application of Berra's explanation for the
Yankees' 1960 loss is to the rule of harmless error. See William D. Arziiza et al., The
Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697,762-63 (1997).
See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 159 (comments of Sen. Paul Simon)
(describing minor vote shifts that could have changed the outcome and given the White
House to the popular vote loser and observing that "[tjhat strikes me as not being
healthy"); id. at 178-79 (prepared testimony of Amy Isaacs, National Director, Americans
for Democratic Action) (characterizing the possibility of a popular vote loser becoming
President as "the most compelling argument for abolishing the electoral college," noting
"close calls" in numerous elections, and arguing that we should stop "playing 'Russian
Roulette' in the selection of our President").
A full description of elections in which minor changes in the votes of specific states
would have sent the election to the House or resulted in a different winner can be found in
LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 23, at 36-37, tbl. 5 (identifying 22 "hairbreadth
elections"). For criticism of such analyses, see BEST, supra note 36, at 26-28.
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since that has rarely happened, the argument is bolstered by
pointing to the instances in which it almost happened.) But the
World Series analogy draws attention to the fact that the sahent
fact may be not that the popular vote winner can lose the election,
but that the election's outcome can be determined by such small
numbers of voters. The electoral college system increases the
likelihood that a single individual, or a single group, will cast the
deciding vote or votes. It increases the circumstances in which,
like the Mazeroski home run, an individual can have a
disproportionate impact.
The 2000 election was a case in point. Never in recent
memory, perhaps never at all, has the American electorate had a
stronger sense that every vote mattered. It all seemed to come
down to Florida, and there the election was excruciatingly close.
And it only came down to Florida because of almost as close tallies
in a number of other states, in any one of which a sh^t shift could
also have changed the overall outcome. But the national election
was not excruciatingly close, nor is it likely ever to be simply
because the electorate is so large.
Some defenders of the electoral college see this characteristic
as its greatest strength. Alan Natapoff, an MIT physics professor
with a sidehne in the electoral college, and a particular fan of the
World Series analogy, endorses the current system because it
enhances the potential for individual impact."^ His argument that
the electoral college maximizes individual impact is convincing but
incomplete in two ways. First, Natapoff never explains why the
goal of an election system should be to maximize individual
impact. One possible justification would be that it increases
turnout, though Natapoff does not say that. He does imply that it
increases the excitement of the election, the way it increases the
excitement of the World Series, but that seems a pecuhar, or at
least marginal, goal for an electoral mechanism. Second, while the
odds of an individual casting a decisive vote are higher with the
electoral college system than they would be in a national direct
election, they remain vanishingly small. Ten times zero is still
zero. No individual will ever cast the single, deciding vote for
President.
A variant of the same point, however, is a longstanding and
important justification for the current system. The electoral
college is generally understood to increase the political power of
certain discrete pohtical minorities—^farmers, or AfricanSee, e.g., Alan Natapoff, A Mathematical One-Man One-Vote Rationale for
Madisonian Presidential Voting Based on Maximum Individual Voting Power, 88 PUB.
CHOICE 259,272 (1996).
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Americans, or the elderly—^because they might form the swing
voters in a critical state. A generation ago, Alexander Bickel
defended the electoral college precisely because it gave racial and
ethnic minorities enhanced strength as the swing votes in large
states."" Bickel's basic argument against abolition of the electoral
college was that, while one could not predict the consequences
"with absolute assurance,... the probabihties are that popular
election of the president would work a diminution of the political
power of racial and other minority groups in the nation's urban
centers.'"^ This tendency to promote the political strength of
ethnic voting blocs has been a central argument for retaining the
electoral college,"' although some have seen it as a shortcoming
rather than a virtue.'"
Without entering into that debate, it does seem fair to say that
the electoral college will make particular voting blocs critical to
the outcome, but it will do so in unpredictable ways. While it is
often suggested that the electoral college enhances AfricanAmerican voting power, Longley and Peirce suggest that, in fact,
African-Americans are consistently disadvantaged by the electoral
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 13.
*'*' Id. As Bickel saw it,
The question about the electoral college, then, should not be whether it is
inevitably and purely majoritarian. It is not, although it is very considerably
more so than our other national institutions. The question should be whether or
not the electoral college tends to enhance minorities rule; whether it tends to
include or exclude various groups from influence in the institution of the
presidency, and whether if it assigns somewhat disproportionate influence to
some groups, they are the ones which are relatively shortchanged in Congress, so
that the total effect is the achievement of a balance of influence? Practical men
should disenfranchise themselves from the romance of pure majoritarianism.
Id. at 17. See also Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE L.J. 1567, 1595-96 (1985) (tying Bickel's approval of the electoral college to his
general doubts about "uncompromising majoritarianism" because of its destabilizing
effects).
See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 129 (prepared testimony of Curtis
B. Gans, Comm. for the Study of the Am. Electorate) (objecting that "[djirect elections
would permit those who conduct a campaign to effectively ignore the needs and desires of
significant minorities in our society," including African-Americans, who "constitute an
ignorable 12 percent of the national voting age population" but "a potentially
determinative minority" in certain states); 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 163,
164-68 (testimony of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Black Leadership Forum) (arguing that direct
election of the President would significantly harm the black electorate).
^ For example, some years ago Representative Ed Gossett (D. Tex.) asked,
rhetorically.
Is it fair, is it honest, is it democratic... to place such a premium on a few
thousand labor votes, or Italian votes, or Irish votes, or Negro votes, or Jewish
votes, or Polish votes, or Communist votes, or big-city machine votes, simply
because they happen to be located in two or three large, industrial pivoti
states?
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 20.
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college system (as are rural voters), while Hispanic, foreign-bom,
Jewish, and urban voters are advantaged.'' This is a matter of
continuing dispute. In the 2000 election, one might reasonably say
that the voting group that ultimately decided the election was the
very conservative Cuban-American population of south Florida.
In 1996, 37 percent of Cuban-Americans in Florida voted for the
Clinton/Gore ticket; in 2000 only 20 percent voted for the
Gore/Lieberman ticket.'" That difference was enough to give Bush
Florida and the White House. On this account, Clinton cost Gore
the election, but the source of the problem was not Monica
Lewinsky but Elian Gonzalez."
The possibility of a political minority affecting the outcome of
the election, and the difficulty of predicting how or where, in fact
tie in well with the World Series. In 2000, Cuban-Americans
played the role of Bill Mazeroski. But one could not have
predicted either in advance. Therefore, it would have been a
mistake for the Yankees to build a defense designed precisely to
guard against a Mazeroski home mn, and it would have been a
mistake for the candidates to pitch their campaign exclusively to
Cuban-Americans. Not only might it have been a mistake because
they might not have been as critical as it tumed out they were, but
focusing on just Mazeroski or Cuban-Americans would have
meant ignoring other players and voters, who might then have
behaved differently than they did in the actual event.
The disproportionate impact of a single brilliant or calamitous
play has one other application to the electoral college. A standard
defense of the electoral college is that it makes it much easier to
51 LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 23, at 154-61. Longley and Peirce's methodology is
not straightforward. They do not focus on whether a particular group might provide the
swing votes in a swing state. Rather, they calculate which states have the most voting
power (by their methodology, the six most populous states have greater than average
voting power, all other states have less than average voting power), then look to see where
members of different groups live. Because blacks are less concentrated in the six most
populous states than in the nation as a whole, they are "disadvantaged" by the system.
This approach is problematic. For example, if blacks were a critical voting blw in any of
the six most populous states, and assuming some commonality of "black concerns
nationwide that would make, say, blacks in California a proxy for blacks generally, it
would not matter that a disproportionately high number of blacks live in the forty-five less
populous states.
52 Dahleen Glanton, Hispanics Turn Florida into More of a Swing State, Cm. TRIB.,
Nov. 26,2000, at 17.
.
53 This is the view of Joe Garcia, Executive Director of the Cuban Amencan National
Foundation. See Alex Veiga, A Year Later, Elian's Echoes Linger, WASH. POST, NOV. 26,
2000, at A2. Of course, the loss of Cuban-American support was no more or less deciswe
than dozens of other phenomena of equal size. No vote or bloc of votes within a winning
total is more or less "decisive" than any other. The baseball analogy here is not the World
Series but the sport's short-lived and appropriately abandoned use of the "game-winning
run batted in" statistic.
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handle allegations of fraud, other voting improprieties, or simple
mistakes. In a close nation-wide direct election, the losing side
would insist on a nationwide recount, claims of fraud around the
country would have to be investigated, and the outcome of the
election thrown in doubt for weeks. By proceeding state by state,
such inquiries are localized and made much more manageable.'"
The baseball equivalent is the spitter that goes unnoticed or
the blown call." But proceeding game by game does not
necessarily isolate and reduce the impact of the blown call. To the
contrary, like Mazeroski's home run or Buckner's error, the
impact of the blown call can be magnified by the fact that we do
not sum total runs to determine a winner. Red Sox fans continue
to be sure that their team lost the 1975 World Series because the
umpires failed to call interference when Ed Armbrister stood in
Carlton Fisk's way as the latter tried to get to Armbrister's bunt in
the 10th inning of the tied third game. Many Democrats have
similar feelings about Florida. Thus, the standard argument about
the advantages of a districted election with regard to contested
outcomes is valid, but incomplete. There is an offsetting
downside—^mistaken or illegal voting in a single state can
determine the entire outcome in a way that would be impossible in
a general, direct election.
CONCLUSION—^A CAUTIONARY NOTE

The analogy between the World Series and the electoral
college works in many ways. It at least helps us understand the
workings of the electoral college—its relative closeness to a purely
majoritarian system, the incentives it creates for candidates, and
the way in which it discounts intense local enthusiasm, requires a
breadth of support, and increases the voting power of individuals
and, more importantly, blocs. It also highlights the central
question of whether states are a relevant unit in picking a
president. (Though it cannot be denied that many have managed
to stumble upon that question unguided by the light cast by this
metaphor.)
The analogy is also helpful because the comparison makes
See 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 13, at 14 (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell);
George F. Will, "Had 'Em All the Way", NEWSWEEK, NOV. 27,2000, at 92.
'5 Other sports provide better analogies to vote fraud—the basketball foul that goes
unseen, or the illegail block in football, or use of banned substances in track and field. One
of baseball's many advantages over other sports is that it provides so few opportunities to
cheat.
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clear that the key characteristics of the electoral college, and the
area of overlap with the World Series, arise from the fact that it is
a system based on districts, not that it is a system based on states.
Just about every aspect of the connection has nothing to do with
the fact that the districts also happen to be states. Indeed, states
may be pretty poor proxies for the units of commonahty
federalism arguments invoke.'® That insight prompts a heretical
thought; perhaps we should have districted presidential elections
while ignoring state boundaries. The suggestion is a political nonstarter, but perhaps one benefit of working through analogies is
that doing so prompts heretical thinking.
At bottom, however, the World Series analogy begs the
question whether it makes sense to set up the World Series and the
presidential election along similar principles. One should be wary
about drawing normative conclusions from the comparison. There
is no necessary reason why the World Series and the election of
the President ought to correspond, and several reasons why they
might not.
First, a particular mechanism or aspect of the system might be
found in both settings, but we may value it for different reasons, or
even wish to maximize it in the one setting and minimize it in the
other. Consider the fact that counting states (or games) mpimizes
individual voting power in the one instance and the possibihty of
an individual player's decisive action in the other. The analogy
helps us to see that that is so but it does not tell us why that is a
good thing. Professor Natapoff, for example, takes it as a given
that the best voting system maximizes individual voting power.
But he does not explain why. Perhaps it is because it creates the
strongest incentive to vote, perhaps it just keeps things interesting,
perhaps it creates an incentive for candidates to be broadly
appealing because they cannot predict who will cast a decisive
vote. Similarly, we might seek to maximize the individual player's
influence for corresponding reasons (to create an incentive to play
hard and be ready, increase suspense, stimulate overall quality), or
perhaps for other ones. The reasons need not be the same.
Certainly in games we often accept or even embrace an element of
pure chance or luck with which we are less comfortable in
elections*
Second, there may be important concerns present in the one
setting but absent in the other. Most importantly, as Professor
Amar put it, one might reject the World Series analogy "[bjecause
all runs are not created equal. But the deep principle in the ethos
^ See supra text following note 39.
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is . . . that all men and women are created equal."" A system in
which many runs turn out to be irrelevant or less weighty than
others violates no independent constraint; a system in which many
votes turn out to be irrelevant or less weighty than others arguably
does violate an independent constraint. So for some the complete
argument against the electoral college is that it is inconsistent with
this principle.'® That objection to the electoral college system may
ultimately not carry the day, but it is no answer to point to the
World Series as a response.
Third, one should be wary about treating baseball, or any
other human construction, as possessed of some intrinsic truth.
The point is much like the standard objections to the nineteenthcentury, Langdellian notion of law as science. Langdell's essential
error was to treat a human creation as having an extra-human,
Platonic existence." Similarly, there is a real risk of getting carried
away with finding normative lessons in sports. For example.
Professor Natapoff has a sophisticated and mathematically
complex defense of the electoral college, but discovers too great a
normative lesson in baseball:
Major sporting championships can and do turn on individual
errors or flashes of brilliance at a critical moment of a critical
game. These dramatic crises are regarded as memorable
treasures, and (implicitly) as validation of the sport's rules and
tradition. By analogy, a few key votes in a close state can turn a
whole presidential outcome. That lesson to candidates is the
moral of this sport.®
Sports do not hold "morals" for constitutional structures. Nor
should we design constitutional structures to maximize
competition, excitement, or the memorableness of outcomes. Nor
does a particular arrangement make sense for presidential
elections because it makes sense for baseball.
In short, the analogy is illuminating and fun. At the end of
^ 1997 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 79 (testimony of Akhil Amar).
^ Writing in support of Senator Bayh's proposal for direct election of the president,
the staff counsel of the ACLU put it succinctly:
The ACLU believes that the electoral college should be abolished and the
President of the United States should be chosen by direct popular election. Our
position is based on the principle that each individual is entitled to have his or
her vote equally weighed in the nation's most important election.
Letter from David E. I^dau, ACLU staff counsel, to Sen. Birch Bayh (Apr. 16, 1979),
reprinted in 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 366.
See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 19621987,100 HARV. L. REV. 761,762 (1987).
See Natapoff, supra note 46, at 272; see also Hively, supra note 35, at 85 (quoting
Natapoff as saying, with regard to the 1960 World Series: "Everybody regarded it as one
of the most glorious World Series ever. To do it any other way would totally destroy the
degree of competition and excitement that's essential to all sports.").
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the day, though, the electoral college and the World Series each
must be evaluated on its independent merits.

